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 Any intelligent fool can make things bigger, more 
complex . . . .  It takes a touch of genius—and a lot of courage—to 




The most casual follower of the current condition of the 
economy and its effects on public governance will note that the 
current financial shortages and the resulting impact on the 
Minnesota public defense2 system are not unique.  The most 
common solutions offered for the restoration of adequate funding 
to the public defense system—such as increased fees,3 layoffs,4 
 
 1. QUOTIKI.COM, http://www.quotiki.com/quotes/12737 (last visited Nov. 7, 
2010). 
 2. See OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, STATE OF MINN., EVALUATION 
REPORT SUMMARY: PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM (Feb. 2010) [hereinafter AUDITOR’S 
REPORT], available at http://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/ped/pedrep/pubdef.pdf. 
 3. An example of an increased fee is the $75 increase in the attorney 
registration fee implemented by the Minnesota Supreme Court in November of 
2009.  Order Temporarily Increasing Lawyer Registration Fees, C1-81-1206 (2009), 
available at http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/0/Public/Clerks_Office/2009
_11_04_Order_Re_Lawyer_Reg_Fees.pdf.  The public defense appropriation for 
fiscal years 2010 and 2011, signed by Governor Pawlenty, called for a $4 million 
reduction in the Board of Public Defense’s (BOPD) budget.  AUDITOR’S REPORT, 
supra note 2, at 32; see also Petition to Continue the Attorney Registration Fee to 
Provide Funding for Public Defense, 7 (Aug. 26, 2010), http://www.mncourts.gov
/Documents/0/Public/Clerks_Office/2010-09-23%20Lawyer%20Reg%20Fee
%20Order.pdf (“We . . . argue that [the lack of adequate funding has] not 
changed and in fact [has] gotten worse.  Since the implementation of the fee, the 
budget for the BOPD has been further reduced.”).  The bill also included a 
request for a $75 increase in the attorney registration fee, with the funds to be 
2
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reductions of service,5 employee buy-outs,6 and increased taxes—
are also not unique and tend to be focused on the short-term.  
Ernest Friedrich “Fritz” Schumacher, an influential Twentieth 
Century British economist and statistician who was influenced by 
fellow German-born Albert Einstein, concisely described the futility 
of this approach.7 
Schumacher was initially influenced by the well-known 
twentieth century economist John Maynard Keynes,8 but later 
diverged from Keynes with his theories involving decentralization.9  
In particular, Schumacher was well known in post-war Europe for 
his economic theories that large organizations must create 
“smallness from bigness” to be more effective.10 
 
dedicated to public defense, a request heeded by the Minnesota Supreme Court.  
AUDITOR’S REPORT, supra note 2, at 32.  Legislative staff estimated that the fee 
increase would result in revenues of about $2.7 million for fiscal years 2010 and 
2011.  AUDITOR’S REPORT, supra note 2, at 32.  The fee increase is only temporary, 
however, as it is set to expire as of July 1, 2011.  Id. at 32–33. 
 4. Pat Kittridge, the chief public defender for Ramsey County, said that 
since 2007 he has lost twelve positions and that he is again facing the prospect of 
layoffs at the end of the 2010 fiscal year.  Joy Powell, Stressed Public Defenders File 
Grievance, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Apr. 12, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 
9239971; see also Joy Powell, Minnesota’s Public Defenders Buried by Caseloads, STAR 
TRIB. (Minneapolis), Mar. 30, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 6299197 (“Last year, 
public defenders saw a 12 percent cut to their budgets and laid off 53 attorneys 
statewide.  Governor Tim Pawlenty now proposes a 5 percent cut, which could lead 
to layoffs of 14 percent of the attorneys, said John Stuart, Minnesota’s chief public 
defender.”). 
 5. Public Defenders May Seek Further Service Reductions, ASS’N OF MINN. CNTYS. (Aug. 
2, 2010) http://www.mncounties.org/publications/update/update2aug10.htm. 
 6. Kevin Duchschere, Hennepin County Seeks Further Cuts in Staff of Defenders, 
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), July 31, 2010, available at http://www.startribune.com
/local/west/99696779.html (“[T]he public defender’s office plans to offer $400 
tax-free for every year of service to veteran county employees who retire or resign . 
. . .”); see also AUDITOR’S REPORT, supra note 2, at 33 (noting that as of May 2009, 
twenty-two individuals had taken advantage of the most recent round of voluntary 
separation, early retirement, and salary saving options). 
 7. See epigraph, supra note 1. 
 8. “Keynes’s [book, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money,] 
revolutionized the way economists thought about economics.  It was pathbreaking 
in several ways, in particular because it introduced the notion . . . that full 
employment could be maintained only with the help of government spending.”  John 
Maynard Keynes, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, http://www.econlib.org
/library/Enc/bios/Keynes.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2010). 
 9. See id. 
 10. Ernest Friedrich Schumacher, QFINANCE.COM, http://www.qfinance.com
/human-and-intellectual-capital-thinkers/ernst-friedrich-schumacher (last visited 
Nov. 24, 2010).  Schumacher also authored the book Small Is Beautiful: A Study of 
Economics as If People Mattered in 1973, proposing “a system of regional economies 
based on social and ecological principles.”  Id.  He is also quoted as saying, “Man is 
3
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Whether the solution for short-term budget deficits in 
Minnesota’s public defense system ought to occur via increased 
taxes or reductions of services and personnel is not the focus of this 
article.  Instead, this article will focus on the governance of public 
defense, and how changes thereto will address long-term issues of 
public funding and, more importantly, increase public defense’s 
effectiveness.11  Further, such changes will better equip the public 
defense system to address inevitably recurring funding shortfalls.12 
The overriding premises for this article are as follows: 
1. There is no “new” money. 
2. Criminal defense is constitutionally required to be 
provided. 
3. Financial struggles within the Minnesota public defense 
system are not unique in government. 
4. Problem-solving focus in the broader criminal justice 
community will aid in resolving the funding issue in public 
defense and elsewhere in government. 
The overriding governance principle used to resolve public 
defense’s financial inadequacies, while addressing the above 
premises, is decentralization.13  This principle of change is long-
term in its approach and requires a change of direction, first, by 
policymakers and, second, by those within the system.  Ultimately, 
these changes require increased trust among the professionals 
within the system who must work with limited resources14 to 
maximize incentives and benefits for those served and for the 
public that supports and benefits from this system. 
This article will proceed as follows: 





small, and, therefore, small is beautiful.”  Id. 
 11. See infra Part IV. 
 12. The authors wish to point out that, as here and elsewhere in the article, 
though the focus is the public defense system in Minnesota, the governance 
problems identified and resolutions, apply to all public agencies and branches of 
government. 
 13. See Daniel Treisman, Decentralization and the Quality of Government 2–3 
(Nov. 20, 2000) (unpublished article) (on file with author) (discussing five 
decentralization frameworks); infra notes 124–25. 
 14. See infra Part III.C.1. 
 15. See infra Part II. 
4
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2. Identify the current problems in Minnesota’s Public Defense 
System, including a review of the major findings made by the 
Minnesota Office of the Legislative Auditor in February of 2010.16 
3. Provide solutions to the public defense system’s current 
problems, including a comparison of this article’s proposals to 
some of the recommendations made by the Minnesota Office of 
the Legislative Auditor.17 
II. HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
A. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel 
The right to counsel found in the Sixth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution has its roots in English jurisprudence.  The right 
to an attorney in a criminal case first appeared in England during 
the twelfth century.18  “[P]arties in civil cases and persons accused 
of misdemeanors were entitled to the full assistance of counsel.”19  
Persons charged with treason or felony, however, were generally 
denied the aid of counsel.20  “After the revolution of 1688, the rule 
was abolished as to treason, but was otherwise steadily adhered to 
until 1836, when by act of Parliament the full right [to counsel] was 
granted in respect of felonies generally.”21 
The American colonies initially adopted English law and 
common law practices, but over time began to recognize the 
importance of the right to counsel.22  Legal transformations such as 
the use of public prosecutors, the aversion to English common law, 
and the rise of legal codes and courts unique to the colonies led 
people to seek out individuals familiar with the law despite strong 
anti-lawyer sentiments.23  When the federal Constitution was 
adopted on September 17, 1787, twelve of the thirteen colonies 
 
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. See infra Part IV. 
 18. David L. Wilson, Note, Making a Case for Preserving the Integrity of 
Minnesota’s Public Defender System: Kennedy v. Carlson, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
1117, 1121 (1996) (citing ROBERT A. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
1776–1791, at 5–6 (1991)). 
 19. Powell v. Alabama., 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932). 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. 
 22. Wilson, supra note 18, at 1122 (citing WILLIAM F. MCDONALD, IN DEFENSE 
OF INEQUALITY: THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND CRIMINAL DEFENSE, THE DEFENSE OF 
COUNSEL 20 (1983)).  The key protection from arbitrariness and oppression by the 
government offered to the colonies, as in England, was the right to trial.  Id. 
 23. Id. at 1122–23.  
5
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recognized the right to counsel in all criminal prosecutions, except 
in one or two instances where the right was limited to capital 
offenses or to the more serious crimes.24  
The Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution provides, 
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . 
[to] have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”25  The right to 
the assistance of counsel meant only that an accused person could 
retain an attorney.26  The Court construed the Sixth Amendment’s 
right to counsel to mean that in federal courts, counsel must be 
provided for defendants unable to employ counsel unless 
competently, knowingly, and intelligently waived.27  
B. A Fundamental Right 
In 1932, in Powell v. Alabama, the famous “Scottsboro Case,” 
the Court concluded that under the circumstances of the case, the 
“necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure of 
the trial court to make an effective appointment of counsel was 
likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”28  However, the Court limited its 
decision, deciding that: 
in a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ 
counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own 
defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, 
illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether 
requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary 
requisite of due process of law; and that duty is not 
discharged by an assignment at such a time or under such 
circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in 
the preparation and trial of the case.  To hold otherwise 
would be to ignore the fundamental postulate, already 
adverted to, “that there are certain immutable principles 
of justice which inhere in the very idea of free 




 24. Powell, 287 U.S. at 64–65 (discussing  in detail the right to counsel 
provided by the thirteen colonies’ state constitutions and statutes).  
 25. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 26. Wilson, supra note 18, at 1124. 
 27. E.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464–65 (1938). 
 28. Powell, 287 U.S. at 71. 
 29. Id. at 71–72 (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 386 (1898)). 
6
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In 1942 the Court in Betts v. Brady again addressed the issue of 
whether the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel was 
incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment to the states.30  
The Betts Court ultimately held that a refusal to appoint counsel for 
an indigent defendant charged with a felony in a state court 
proceeding did not necessarily violate the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the “appointment of counsel 
is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial.”31  The Betts 
Court stated that while the Sixth Amendment laid down no rule for 
the conduct of the states, “the question recurs whether the 
constraint laid by the amendment upon the national courts 
expresses a rule so fundamental and essential to a fair trial, and so, 
to due process of law, that it is made obligatory upon the states by 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”32 
In 1963, in Gideon v. Wainright, which had facts similar to those 
in Betts, the Court granted certiorari to address the controversy and 
litigation over a defendant’s federal constitutional right to counsel 
in a state court, and unanimously overruled Betts.33  The Gideon 
Court concluded that the right to counsel of one charged with a 
crime was fundamental and essential.34  The Court held that the 
Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, providing that in all 
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to assistance 
of counsel for his defense, was made obligatory on the states by the 
Fourteenth Amendment and that an indigent defendant in a 
criminal prosecution in a state court has the right to have counsel 
appointed for him.35   
Justice Black, writing for the Court, noted that reason and 
reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary 
system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, 
who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair 
trial unless counsel is provided for him.  This seems to us 
to be an obvious truth.36 
 
 30. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
 31. Id. at 471. 
 32. Id. at 465. 
 33. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 338 (1963).  Three states asked that 
Betts v. Brady be left intact. Twenty-two states, as friends of the Court, argued Betts 
was “an anachronism when handed down” and that it should be overruled.  Id. at 
345. 
 34. Id. at 344. 
 35. Id. at 340–41. 
 36. Id. at 344. 
7
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Though the scope of the Gideon decision was limited to felony 
prosecutions, the right to counsel has since been expanded.  In 
1967, the Court extended the right to counsel to children charged 
with juvenile delinquency.37  In 1972, the right to counsel was 
expanded to any case in which the defendant could be sentenced 
to imprisonment.38  In 2002, the Court found that defendants must 
receive counsel if they received a suspended jail sentence or were 
placed on probation, and later, the probation was revoked and 
imprisonment imposed.39  In Minnesota, defendants also have a 
statutory right to counsel in their first direct appeal of a verdict and 
in appeals following a guilty plea.40 
C. Right to Counsel in Minnesota41  
Prior to Gideon, states used three different model systems of 
providing counsel to indigent defendants: contracts, assigned 
counsel, and public defenders.42  Under the contract system, the 
state or county would solicit and receive bids.43  The assigned 
counsel system used private lawyers who were court appointed and 
compensated.44  The public defender system used full-time, salaried 
staff and attorneys.45Minnesota utilized the assigned counsel 
 
 37. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (“We conclude that the Due Process 
Clause . . . requires that in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency which 
may result in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile’s freedom is 
curtailed, the child and his parents must be notified of the child’s right to 
counsel.”). 
 38. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (“[A]bsent a knowing and 
intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified 
as petty, misdemeanor, or felony,  unless he was represented by counsel at his 
trial.”). 
 39. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674 (2002). 
 40. MINN. STAT. § 611.14(2) (2010). 
 41. The Bill of Rights in Minnesota’s Constitution directly addresses the 
rights of the accused in criminal prosecutions.  MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“The 
accused shall enjoy the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor and to have the assistance of counsel in 
his defense.”); see also Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. 1996) (public 
defenders cannot refuse to accept new clients under Minnesota law).  
 42. Wilson, supra note 18, at 1129–30. 
 43. Id. (citing STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, 
5-3.1 cmt. (1990)). 
 44. Id. (citing Nancy Gist, Assigned Counsel: Is the Representation Effective?, 4 
CRIM. JUST. 16, 16–17 (1989)).  
 45. Id. (citing Randolph N. Stone, The Role of State Funded Programs in Legal 
Representation of  Indigent Defendants in Criminal Cases, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 205, 
8
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system;46 attorneys were available only for indigent defendants 
charged with felonies or gross misdemeanors.47  The small number 
of indigent defendants for whom courts appointed counsel were 
generally represented by volunteer legal service agencies and 
uncompensated attorneys.48 
In 1965, following Gideon, Minnesota adopted legislation to 
create full-time and part-time public defenders.49  Minnesota’s 
public defender system was revised throughout the 1980s, and since 
then the legislature has made significant structural and 
organizational changes.50 
Until the late 1980s, the funding of public defender services in 
Minnesota was primarily a county responsibility.51  Each of the ten 
judicial districts in the state were responsible for administering this 
constitutionally mandated service;52 financial resources were 
provided from property tax revenues.53  
In 1981, the State Board of Public Defense was created by the 
legislature to oversee the public defense system and to distribute 
any funds appropriated by the state for public defense services.54  
 
209–10 (1993)).  
 46. Id. at 1130 (citing Charles W. Wolfram, Scottsboro Boys in 1991: The Promise 
of Adequate Criminal Representation Through the Years, 1 CORNELL J.L & PUB. POL’Y 61, 
Appendix (1992) (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 611.07, .12, .13 (1945))).  While 
Minnesota generally used the assigned counsel program, Hennepin and Ramsey 
Counties had public defender offices and did not use an assigned counsel 
program.  Id. at 1130 n.76.   
 47. Id. at 1130.  In 1917, the Minnesota legislature created an option for 
county judges to establish public defender offices in counties with populations of 
at least 300,000.  Act of Apr. 21, 1917, ch. 496, §§ 1–7, 1917 Minn. Laws 835, 835–
36 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 611.12 (1988), repealed by Act of June 3, 
1989, ch. 335, art. 3, § 57, subdiv. 2, 1989 Minn. Laws 2691, 2932).  
 48. Jeffrey H. Rutherford, Comment, Dziubak v. Mott and the Need to Better 
Balance the Interests of the Indigent Accused and Public Defenders, 78 MINN. L. REV. 977, 
982 (1994).  Counsel in Minnesota was compensated, however, when the 
assignment was mandatory upon request by the defendant.  See MINN. STAT. §§ 
611.07, .12, .13 (1945).  
 49. Act of May 26, 1965, ch. 869, §§ 1–20, 1965 Minn. Laws 1631, 1632–39 
(codified as amended as MINN. STAT. §§ 611.14–.21, .23–.26, .27 (2008)). 
 50. See infra notes 54–62 and accompanying text. 
 51. Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn 1996). 
 52. Id.  Minnesota’s eighty-seven counties are organized into ten judicial 
districts.  Eight of the ten districts are comprised of multiple counties.  Ramsey 
and Hennepin Counties, however, are their own districts, the Second and Fourth 
Districts respectively.  See Minnesota District Courts, http://www.mncourts.gov
/?page=238 (last visited Nov. 24, 2010). 
 53. Kennedy, 544 N.W.2d at 3 (citing MINN. STAT. §§ 611.26, 611.27 (1965)). 
 54. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 611.215 (1994)); see also Act of  June 1, 1981, ch. 
356, § 360, 1981 Minn. Laws 1770, 1982 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 
9
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The State Board of Public Defense, however, was not subject to the 
judicial branch’s administrative control.55  The State Board of 
Public Defense assumed the duty of appointing chief public 
defenders to the judicial districts.56  The Board of Public Defense 
delegated responsibility for distributing state public defender 
funding to each judicial district.57  In 1987, the legislature 
expanded the authority of the State Public Defender.58 
In 1989, the legislature began shifting the financial burden of 
funding the state’s public defender offices from the counties to the 
state.59  The transfer of the primary financial responsibility for 
public defense was completed in 1990, when the legislature 




 55. Act of  June 1, 1981, ch. 356, § 360, 1981 Minn. Laws 1770, 1982 (codified 
as amended at MINN. STAT. § 611.215 (2008)).  MINN. STAT. § 611.215, subdiv. 1(a) 
provides “The State Board of Public Defense is a part of, but is not subject to the 
administrative control of, the judicial branch of government.” 
 56. See Act of  June 1, 1981, ch. 356, § 364, 1981 Minn. Laws 1770, 1983–84 
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 611.26, subdiv. 2 (2008)). 
 57. Act of May 26, 1987, ch. 250, § 18, 1987 Minn. Laws 889, 897 (codified as 
amended at MINN. STAT. § 611.27 (1988), repealed by Act of Apr. 2, 1998, ch. 356, 
art. 8, § 26, 1998 Minn. Laws 666, 756). 
 58. The legislature modified the Board of Public Defense’s membership, 
created an administrative office, instituted greater oversight of the State Public 
Defender’s office, created two new judicial district public defender officers, 
mandated new standards regulating the offices and conduct of all public defender 
organizations, and established new reporting, budgeting, and funding processes.  
Act of May 26, 1987, ch. 250, §§ 1–18, 1987 Minn. Laws 889, 897 (codified as 
amended at MINN. STAT. §§ 611.215–.27). 
 59. Act of June 3, 1989, ch. 335, art. 1, § 7, 1989 Minn. Laws 2693, 2699–700.  
This shift in financing was based on the idea that a centralized state system would 
be more efficient.  Wilson, supra note 18, at 1130 n.81 (citing Appellant’s Brief at 
5, Kennedy, 544 N.W.2d 1 (No. CO-95-1282)).  This idea was based on the counties’ 
inability to cope with increased costs, the inequality amongst counties in 
generating property tax revenue, and a drought in the late 1980s which 
significantly reduced rural counties’ tax revenue.  Id.  For most of Minnesota’s 
history, court funding has been through county boards.  Scott Russell, Courts at the 
Tipping Point: Tight Funding Imperils Justice Function, 65 BENCH & B. MINN. 20, 24 
(Dec. 2008).  “Services varied considerably, depending on the county’s property 
wealth and political will.  State leaders found service disparities unacceptable.”  Id.  
In the 1990s, the state began taking over court funding starting with a pilot 
program in the Eighth Judicial District, and by July 2005 courts were fully state 
funded.  Id. 
 60. In 1989, the legislature expanded the authority of the Board of Public 
Defense to include all ten judicial districts.  Act of June 3, 1989, ch. 335, art. 1, § 
262, 1989 Minn. Laws 2897 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 611.215, subdiv. 
2 (2008)).  This transfer was to take place within one year, but the completion 
10
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The State Board of Public Defense is required by statute to 
recommend to the legislature a budget for statewide public defense 
services,61 and then distribute the funds to all public defender 
offices.62  Therefore, under the current funding system, public 
defenders rely almost entirely upon state funding for their budgets. 
The right to counsel is constitutionally guaranteed in certain 
circumstances.63  In other contexts, the right to counsel is based on 
statute or the exercise of the inherent power of the courts.64  
Currently, the following persons who are financially unable65 to 
obtain counsel are entitled66 to be represented by a public 
defender: 
(1) a person charged with a felony, gross 
misdemeanor, or misdemeanor including a person 
charged under Minnesota Statute sections 
629.01 to 629.29 (2008); 
(2) a person appealing from a conviction of a felony 
or gross misdemeanor, or a person convicted of a 
felony or gross misdemeanor, who is pursuing a 
postconviction proceeding and who has not 
already had a direct appeal of the conviction; 
 
 
date was extended until 1997.  See Act of May 25, 1995, ch. 226, art. 6, § 14, 1995 
Minn. Laws 1753, 1876–77 (repealed 1998). 
 61. MINN. STAT. § 611.215, subdiv. 2 (2008). 
 62. MINN. STAT. § 611.27, subdiv. 1(b) (2008); see also Kennedy, 544 N.W.2d at 
3 (“In distributing funds to district public defenders, the board shall consider the 
geographic distribution of public defenders, the equity of compensation among 
the judicial districts, public defender case loads, and the results of the weighted 
case load study.”).   
 63. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963) (declaring 
that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution give 
an indigent defendant in criminal proceedings in state court a right to court-
appointed counsel). 
 64. In re Welfare of J.B., 782 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 2010).  In addition to 
MINN. STAT. § 611.14 (2008), which provides a right to a public defender for 
indigent persons accused of certain crimes, the right to counsel is provided in the 
following: MINN. STAT. § 253B.07, subdiv. 2c (2008) (civil commitment matters); 
MINN. STAT. § 524.5-304(b) (2008 & Supp. 2009) (guardianship matters); MINN. 
STAT. § 257.69, subdiv. 1 (2008); Cox v. Slama, 355 N.W.2d 401, 403-04 (Minn. 
1984) (civil contempt proceedings); Hepfel v. Bashaw, 279 N.W.2d 341, 341 
(Minn. 1976) (paternity cases); State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 399, 154 N.W.2d 888, 
895 (Minn. 1967) (invoking the inherent power of the court to provide counsel in 
misdemeanor cases). 
 65. Determination of financial eligibility for appointment of a public 
defender is evaluated under MINN. STAT. § 611.17 (2008 & Supp. 2009).  
 66. MINN. STAT. § 611.14 (a) (2008). 
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(3) a person who is entitled to be represented by 
counsel under Minnesota Statute section 609.14, 
subdivision 2 (2008); or 
(4) a minor ten years of age or older who is entitled to 
be represented by counsel under Minnesota 
Statute section 260B.163, subdivision 4 (2008), 
or section 260C.163, subdivision 3 (2008). 
Despite—and, the authors suggest, perhaps as a result of—the 
conversion of the public defender system to a statewide system, 
there exists significant shortages which have resulted in a threat to 
the primary goal of the system: to provide legal services to indigent 
individuals who are entitled to be represented by a public 
defender.  This will be explored in the following sections.   
III. IDENTIFYING THE CURRENT PROBLEMS IN THE PUBLIC 
DEFENSE SYSTEM 
As noted in the outset of this article, the economic slowdown 
has affected the public defense system as drastically as any part of 
government.  As a result of budget cuts and the simultaneous affect 
of increased case filings in Minnesota, the public defender 
workloads have increased,67 and the time spent by individual public 
 
 67. “[The] National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and 
Goals recommended the following maximum annual caseloads for a public 
defender office, i.e., on average, the lawyers in the office should not exceed, per 
year, more than 150 felonies; 400 misdemeanors; 200 juvenile court cases; 200 
mental health cases; or 25 appeals.”  ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND 
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, ABA EIGHT GUIDELINES OF PUBLIC DEFENSE RELATED TO 
EXCESSIVE WORKLOADS 9 n.30 (2009), available at http://www.abanet.org
/legalservices/sclaid/defender/downloads/eight_guidelines_of_public_defense.p
df (citing NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE 
DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL 66 (2009), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/manage
/file/139.pdf).  However, as noted by the ABA, “these caseload numbers are 35 
years old, the numbers were never ‘empirically based,’ and were intended ‘for a 
public defender’s office, not necessarily for each individual attorney in that 
office.’”  Id.  Minnesota’s weighted caseloads per attorney far exceed that standard.  
In 2009, 376 full-time equivalent attorneys handled an average of 779 weighted 
case units per attorney.  AUDITOR’S REPORT, supra note 2, at 36 tbl.3:1.  In 2009 
weighted caseloads in the districts ranged from a low of 688 in the Seventh District 
(ten counties in central Minnesota) to 860 in the Ninth District (seventeen 
counties in the northwest).  Id.  Furthermore, Minnesota’s public defender office 
does not have caseload limits or the authority to refuse appointments due to 
caseload.  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF PUBLIC 
DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007: PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007—STATISTICAL TABLES 
tbl.7a (Nov. 19, 2009, revised June 17, 2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov
12
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defenders on cases has also decreased.68 
The representation of those charged with crimes is a 
constitutional obligation of the state.69  The criminal justice system 
has no choice other than to provide legal representation to 
indigent individuals charged with crimes.70  Further, though 
reference to the public defender system in the Legislative Auditor’s 
Report is limited to those situations as set forth in Minnesota 
Statute section 611.14, this article references all situations in the 
Minnesota court system, constitutionally and statutorily, in which 
an attorney is appointed at public expense.71 
The problems, however, will not be resolved by additional 
funds, which are not forthcoming, and some of the suggestions as 
outlined in the Legislative Auditor’s Report will exacerbate the 
problems. 
A. Funding is Not the Problem 
Funding, or more accurately the lack thereof, is not the 
problem in the public defense system or, for that matter, elsewhere 
in government.  As is described below, the centralized governance 
model, which minimizes the best use of existing funding, is the 
 
/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=1758; see also Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1, 4–5 
(Minn. 1996). 
 68. AUDITOR’S REPORT, supra note 2, at 36 tbl.3:1; see also Duchschere, supra 
note 6; Public Defenders May Seek Further Service Reductions, ASS’N OF MINN. CNTYS., (Aug. 
2, 2010), http://www.mncounties.org/publications/update/update2aug10.htm 
(examining the third judicial district in southeast Minnesota); Frederick Melo, 
Overworked, Understaffed Attorneys Seeking Relief: Minnesota Public Defenders Question If 
Justice Is Served, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Aug. 17, 2010, 2010 WLNR 
16495816 (“Chief Public Defender Karen Duncan will ask a Steele County judge to 
remove public defenders from 45 open cases, which would be a bold first for 
Minnesota.”). 
 69. MINN. STAT. § 611.14(a) (2008); see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335 (1963). 
 70. See Gideon, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (reasoning that indigent defendants must 
be represented by counsel to assure a fair trial). 
 71. AUDITOR’S REPORT, supra note 2, at 6.  Within the constitutional 
framework, Minnesota statute requires a public defender to be appointed to 
persons who are financially unable to obtain counsel and fit into one of the 
categories listed in Minnesota Statute section 611.14(a) (2008).  See also MINN. 
STAT. § 253B.07, subdiv. 2(c) (2008) (civil commitment matters); MINN. STAT. § 
257.69, subdiv. 1 (2008) (guardianship matters); MINN. STAT. § 524.5-304(b) 
(2008) (proceedings); Hepfel v. Bashaw, 279 N.W.2d 341, 341 (Minn. 1976) 
(paternity cases); State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 154 N.W.2d 888, 894 (1967) 
(invoking the inherent power of the court to provide counsel in misdemeanor 
cases). 
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problem.  Therefore, once the structure is identified as the 
problem, we know that adding additional funds to an organization 
with structural defects cannot provide a solution. 
The easiest solution offered by those of us in public service 
when we are short of funds is to increase revenue.72  Of course, this 
separates the real solution, effective governance, from those who 
are paying for it, the public.  This solution does not provide 
leadership in our role as keepers of the public trust, and it does not 
engender changes that might be necessary to address economic 
realities.  Further, Minnesota history demonstrates that there have 
been constant increases in government spending over the course of 
forty years; usually well above the cost of living.73  This reality—that 
increased revenues still results in the current budget shortfall—
suggests convincingly that the lack of revenue is not the issue. 
Further, the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1996 rejected a 
Fourth District public defender’s claim that the lack of funds led to 
ineffective assistance of counsel.74  The court determined:  
The district court did not find that Kennedy’s staff had 
provided ineffective assistance to any particular client, nor 
did it find that Kennedy faced professional liability as a 
result of his office’s substandard services.  Nor do any of 
Kennedy’s clients join him in attacking the statutory 
funding scheme at issue here by presenting evidence of 
inadequate assistance in particular cases.  In light of 
Kennedy’s failure to provide more substantial evidence of 
an “injury in fact” to himself or his clients, we hold that 
the district court erred in granting Kennedy’s summary 
judgment motion.75 
This decision supports a conclusion that further funding will 
not solve the long-term problems associated with the State’s 
obligation to provide attorneys for those who cannot afford 
counsel. 
 
 72. See supra notes 2, 6 and accompanying text. 
 73. Peter J. Nelson, New Budget Tools for a Balanced Minnesota: Recommendations 
and a Preview, Capitol Solutions: Recommendations for the 2010 Legislative Session, CTR. 
OF THE AM. EXPERIMENT, (Feb. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Capitol Solutions], available at 
http://www.americanexperiment.org/uploaded/files/2010_publications/capitol
_solutions_budget_tools/cae_budget_process_recommendations.pdf. 
 74. Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Minn. 1996). 
 75. Id. 
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 15
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss2/15
  
2011] THE MINNESOTA PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM  613 
B. Centralization is the Problem—Not Part of the Solution 
Minnesota moved to a centralized system beginning in the 
early 1980s.  The issues of lack of efficiency resulting in funding 
shortages persisted early on during this transition, existed during 
the 1990s as demonstrated in Kennedy,76 and still persist today.   
The State Board of Public Defense has assumed responsibilities 
for the public defense system that was previously a “patchwork of 
local public defense systems.”77  The legislature tasked the Board of 
Public Defense to oversee the public defense system in Minnesota 
as part of the State’s takeover of funding for the entire system.78  
There is no reason to doubt this portion of the Legislative 
Auditor’s Report, or to believe that the Board of Public Defense has 
not executed its responsibilities well.  However, the Legislative 
Auditor’s Report did not address whether this was the best form of 
governance for the public defense system.79  The empirical 
evidence will suggest that it is not. 
The Kennedy court recognized the great importance the 
Judiciary has placed upon the role of public defense of adults and 
juveniles charged with crimes, and that funding must be adequate.80  
Further, the Kennedy court noted that the increased caseload along 
with stretched budgets was straining all of public defense at that 
time.81  
The current Legislative Auditor’s Report confirms that this 
poor financial condition continues today.  Expenditures during the 
2008–09 biennium for the public defender system totaled $136 
million with staffing of about 528 full-time-equivalent staff.82  
Budget reductions in the public defense system resulted in staff 
reductions in fiscal years 2003 through 2005.83 
Therefore, although the centralized system may be more 
streamlined, these numbers suggest that it may have been 
streamlined in less than the most efficient way. 
 
 76. Id. at 3. 
 77. AUDITOR’S REPORT, supra note 2, at x. 
 78. MINN. STAT. § 611.215 (2008). 
 79. See AUDITOR’S REPORT, supra note 2. 
 80. Kennedy, 544 N.W.2d at 3. 
 81. Id. 
 82. AUDITOR’S REPORT, supra note 2, at 12. 
 83. Id. 
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C. Lack of Professional Trust and Incentive 
Typical of most forms of centralization is that there becomes a 
tendency to control an organization from the top.84  The “best” 
form of control requires uniformity from the top so that, 
consequently, it is easier to assure compliance and to report such 
compliance to the legislature.85  Also, if a decision is made from a 
 
 84. See, e.g., HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION 198 
(Comm’n of the Cent. Comm. of the C.P.S.U. (B.) ed. 1939), available at 
http://www.marx2mao.com/PDFs/HCPSU39.pdf  (discussing “democratic 
centralism”  and noting that “all decisions of higher bodies shall be absolutely 
binding on lower bodies”). 
 85. See MINN. STAT. § 611.215, subdiv. 2(c) (2008) (describing the standards 
that must be approved by the board, established by the state public defender, and 
applied to “the offices of the state and district public defenders and [to] the 
conduct of all appointed counsel systems”).  The legislation that created the 
current public defender system specifically included a requirement that the State 
Board of Public Defense report to the legislature regarding budgeting 
recommendations for “the board, the office of state public defender, the judicial 
district public defenders, and the public defense corporations.”  Id. at subdiv. 2(a).  
The following are examples of policies within the State Judicial System Minnesota 
Judicial Branch Policy/Procedure that demonstrate other attempts at uniformity:  
“It is the policy of the Minnesota Judicial Branch to utilize uniform court practices 
to promote reliable and consistent statewide data and reporting.”  Memorandum 
from State Court Adm’r on Policy No. 506(e): Uniform MNCIS Data Entry 
Standards for Problem-Solving Courts Policy and Procedure (June 18, 2010) (on 
file with author). 
  “This policy implements Judicial Branch Policy 503, which designates 
court forms identified as Statewide on the judicial branch websites and MNCIS as 
mandatory court forms.  Mandatory court forms must be used without alteration, 
except to the extent local modification is permitted under this implementing 
policy.”  Memorandum from State Court Adm’r on Policy 503(a): Development 
and Modification of Court Forms Policy and Procedure (July 1, 2009) (on file with 
author).    
  “It is the policy of the Minnesota Judicial Branch, pursuant to Minn. Stat. 
§ 609.491, subd. 1, that court administration shall enter a plea of guilty and 
conviction when a person fails to appear for a petty misdemeanor offense.”  
Memorandum from Judicial Council on Policy 515: Petty Misdemeanor Failure to 
Appear (Feb. 3, 2009) (on file with author).  This example involves a statewide 
policy that affects an individual judge’s adjudicative responsibility to resolve an 
issue on a case-by-case basis.  See id.   
  See also Minn. Judicial Council, Priorities & Strategies for Minnesota’s Judicial 
Branch: Focus on the Future, MINN. JUDICIAL BRANCH, http://www.mncourts.gov
/Documents/0/Public/Judicial_Council/FY10-11_Strategic_Plan.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 24, 2010) (incorporating some of these policies as well as other policies into 
its strategic plan).   
  It is not the author’s intention to debate whether these specific examples 
cited are poor policy decisions.  Rather, the examples reference a sampling of the 
plethora of decisions made in a centralized form of governance that increase ease 
in central reporting to the legislature, but necessarily stifle local policy discretion, 
which may better serve the citizens in that local area.  
16
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centralized location––in this case the Board of Public Defense––
this centralized decision must be the best way to proceed regardless 
of the realities in the local judicial districts or the counties within 
those districts. 
A common product of such centralization is the resulting 
mistrust among fellow professionals at different levels of the 
organization.  Some of this mistrust is demonstrated in the 
Recommendations of the Legislative Auditor, which are described 
and responded to below.   
1. “The Supervision of Public Defenders Needs to Be Strengthened”86 
The Legislative Auditor’s Report concludes: “We found 
weaknesses in day-to-day supervision of assistant public 
defenders. . . . Public defense officials said they want to increase the 
ratio of supervisors to assistant public defenders, but have been 
stymied by budget restraints.”87   
This comment overlooks the individual professional 
responsibilities of public defenders.  Attorneys in the public 
defense system are all trained in the same matter as all lawyers in 
the state.  Public defenders must pass the bar exam and must be 
licensed to practice law in Minnesota.88  Further, all lawyers in the 
public defense system must practice under the same ethical 
obligations as all other lawyers.89  Finally, most experienced lawyers 
in each of the communities where public defenders work are 
willing and anxious to provide mentoring advice to newer attorneys 
as needed. 
The report does not identify specific examples of problems 
that resulted from this “lack of supervision.”  Thus, one is left with 
the implication that these attorneys are not to be fully trusted to 
follow the dictates of their legal training and ethical obligation.  It 
 
 86. AUDITOR’S REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See, e.g., Assistant Public Defender—Winona and Olmsted Counties, MINN. 
BOARD OF PUB. DEF., http://agency.governmentjobs.com/pubdefmn/job
_bulletin.cfm?JobID=272329 (last visited Nov. 24, 2010) (soliciting applicants for 
an assistant public defender position and noting that one requirement for 
employment is “admission to the Bar of the State of Minnesota”).  See also State of 
Minnesota Rules of Admission to the Bar, MINN. STATE BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS, 
http://www.ble.state.mn.us/rules.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2010) (detailing 
Minnesota’s rules for admission to the bar).  
 89. See MINN. R. PROF’L CONDUCT (2008) (referring to all lawyers generally in 
most provisions). 
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leads, as suggested by the Legislative Auditor’s Report, to requests 
for further funding so that more supervision may occur according 
to centralized bureaucratic standards.90 
2. “Minnesota May Need to Reconsider its Heavy Reliance on Part-
Time Public Defenders”91 
As noted in the Legislative Auditor’s Report, as of July 2009 
approximately “half of the state’s 450 public defenders . . . worked 
on a part-time basis.”92  As one reads the report, it is obvious that 
the authors view the use of part-time public defenders negatively.93  
However, this appears to be based upon the overriding centralized 
governance philosophy that in order for professionals to be most 
effective, they must be supervised by more professionals, and there 
must be uniformity in policies and procedures to assure such 
professionalism.  There is no empirical evidence to support such a 
philosophy, but there is much research to the contrary.94 
All part-time public defenders must be as equally educated as 
those who are full-time public defenders and are equally obligated 
to comply with the rules of professional ethics.95  This latter 
requirement includes the obligation that public defenders must 
provide competent representation for their clients, whether those 






 90.  See AUDITOR’S REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.  
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. 
 93. See id. at 2–3.  
 94. See Treisman, supra note 13; Thomas Paine also once stated, “That 
government is best which governs least.” QUOTEDB (Dec. 9, 2010), 
http://www.quotedb.com/quotes/1213. 
 95. See, e.g., Assistant Public Defender—Winona and Olmsted Counties, supra note 
88 (soliciting applicants for an assistant public defender position and noting that 
one requirement for employment is “[g]raduation from an accredited college of 
law”).  See also MINN. R. PROF’L CONDUCT (2008) (referring to all lawyers generally 
in most provisions). 
 96. See MINN. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.1 (2008) (“A lawyer shall provide 
competent representation to a client.  Competent representation requires legal 
knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation.”).  This rule does not distinguish between types of clients and 
imposes the duty of competent representation on lawyers with respect to all 
clients.  See id. 
18
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Many people consider it a mark of effective legal advocacy 
when a lawyer has represented both sides of an issue.97  When I was 
first practicing law in Canby, Minnesota,98 my firm represented 
local cities in the prosecution of misdemeanor and gross 
misdemeanor offenses. 99  At the same time, I had a contract with 
the State of Minnesota to serve as a part-time public defender.100  I 
am convinced that my obligations to represent clients on both sides 
of the criminal issue, all while watching for conflicts of interest, 
made me a better advocate for my clients, including my criminal 
defense clients.  
Under the current system, such dual roles are discouraged.101  
This is a further example of the centralization philosophy, which 
hinders rather than enhances the effectiveness of the criminal 
defense attorney.102 
As a judge in the Eighth Judicial District in Minnesota, the 
majority of criminal matters over which I preside involve part-time 
public defenders.103  This has been a long tradition in rural districts 
and, as the Legislative Auditor’s Report notes, sixty-five percent of 
public defenders outside the Twin Cities are part-time.104  I also 
preside over matters in which public defenders are full-time.  Based 
on my experience, both part-time and full-time public defense 
attorneys excel equally at representing their clients.  In my 
 
 97. See Jonathan R. Cohen, The Culture of Legal Denial, 84 NEB. L. REV. 247, 298 
(2005).  “Legal employers hire lawyers to help their clients win cases.  The best 
product in the legal employment market is the lawyer who can skillfully argue for 
either side, and it is that product most law schools seek to produce.”  Id. 
 98. This is in reference to co-author, Judge Randall J. Slieter. 
 99. Qualley, Boulton & Vinberg, in Canby, Minnesota (formerly known as 
Qualley, Boulton & Slieter). 
 100. See AUDITOR’S REPORT, supra note 2, at 18 (describing how both attorney 
and nonattorney staff operate under contract); Minnesota’s Public Defender System, 
MINN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HOUSE RESEARCH (Aug. 2007), 
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/ss/ssmpds.htm#Q7 (noting that 
chief public defenders “contract attorneys within their districts”). 
 101. See AUDITOR’S REPORT, supra note 2, at 27.  “We also think the board needs 
to consider increasing the proportion of full-time to part-time public defenders 
and establishing additional satellite offices.”  Id.  The Auditor’s Report also seems 
to discourage dual roles when it states that “Minnesota’s heavy reliance on part-
time public defenders presents risks that need to be addressed.”  Id. at ix. 
 102. See supra Part III.B. 
 103. See AUDITOR’S REPORT, supra note 2, at 19.  The map indicates that the 
eighth district includes one full-time attorney and sixteen part-time attorneys.  Id.   
The Legislative Auditor’s Report also describes Minnesota’s mix of full-time and 
part-time public defenders as “cost-effective,” “flexible,” and a way “to attract and 
retain very experienced lawyers.”  Id. at 24. 
 104. Id. at x, 25. 
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discussions with other judges from throughout the state, their 
observations are similar. 
Though the Auditor apparently based this recommendation 
upon the concerns expressed by some Chief Public Defenders, the 
Auditor provides no empirical evidence of actual deficiencies in 
defense representation by part-time public defenders.105  No 
analysis suggests such distinctions.  Instead, the Legislative 
Auditor’s Report raises concerns consistent with the centralization 
philosophy of mistrust.106  That is, the Legislative Auditor’s Report 
notes that some public defender supervisors complain about the 
lack of their ability to supervise part-time public defenders and 
raise general concerns about the quality of part-time public 
defenders’ services.107  Further, supervisors complain that part-time 
public defenders may not request investigative or support services, 
even when supervisors believe such support is needed.108 
These supervisors’ complaints and concerns, however, are not 
analyzed for accuracy in the Legislative Auditor’s Report.109  
Further, all part-time public defenders have an equal professional 
and ethical obligation to effectively represent clients and are 
subject to disciplinary action if they fail to do so.110 
It is the author’s opinion that greater, not less, reliance on 
part-time public defenders will be part of the financial solution.111  
However, this requires a change of governance away from the 
current centralized model. 
 
 105. See id. at 26 (noting that several “district chiefs” were merely concerned 
about certain part-time public defenders’ performance); see also id. at 40–43 
(failing to show deficiencies in part-time public defenders as compared to other 
public defenders). 
 106. See id. at 26. 
 107. Id. (expressing concern specifically over part-time public defenders “that 
often work alone and with limited supervision,” and those that are “reluctant to 
challenge judges during their public defense work for fear that doing so would 
damage their private practices”). 
 108. Id. 
 109. See id. (reporting that several district chiefs just “told us they were 
seriously concerned about the performance of certain part-time public 
defenders”). 
 110. See MINN. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.1, 8.4 (2008). 
 111. See supra Part III.A. (indicating that centralized governance is the root of 
the financial problem in the public defender system). 
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3. “The Board of Public Defense Has Taken Important Steps to 
Improve Accountability”112 
Part of a centralized governance model is the belief that 
accountability can only occur if information is funneled to a 
statewide entity which is then able, with relative ease, to report 
public use of money to the legislature.113  Thus, the Legislative 
Auditor’s Report notes that the Board of Public Defense “has 
established a clear chain of accountability from assistant public 
defenders in the field to the board, and it has adopted system-wide 
policies, procedures, and compensation systems.  The state public 
defender has established training programs for public defenders 
and procedures for assessing their performance.”114 
At first glance, this analysis seems convincing.  If a clear chain 
of accountability from the top of an organization to the bottom 
exists, as well as statewide policies, procedures, and training, that 
sounds good.  Note, however, that the Legislative Auditor’s Report 
did not, and could not, report the effect such uniformity of 
procedure has had on the performance of individual public 
defenders on individual cases.115 
As explained below, it is precisely this constrictive adherence 
to uniformity that inhibits the system from improvement and 
efficiency.116  Specifically, if allowing a part-time public defender in 
a location to serve as a city attorney would be prudent, the system 
should allow for such creativity even if such a dual role would not 
be prudent in other areas of the state. 
 
 112. AUDITOR’S REPORT, supra note 2, at x.  The Legislative Auditor’s Report 
also states, “The Board of Public Defense has taken important steps to improve 
accountability, but they could do more to measure and supervise the quality of 
public defender services.”  Id. at 20. 
 113. See supra text accompanying note 85. 
 114. AUDITOR’S REPORT, supra note 2, at x, 21. 
 115. See id. at 18, 20–21.  The Auditor’s Report states: 
The Board of Public Defense and state public defender have emphasized 
quality representation of clients as the office’s top priority.  However, 
they have not developed measures of outcomes related to the quality of 
representation provided to clients.  In October 2009, the state public 
defender asked for and received the board’s approval to begin 
developing criteria of quality representation.  Lack of such criteria make 
it harder to objectively measure the performance of individuals and 
districts.  It also makes it harder for the board to demonstrate to the 
Legislature and others the impact of budget and staff cuts. 
Id. at 21. 
 116. See discussion infra Part IV (describing the motivations and goals of 
centralization). 
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As described below, a number of creative ideas can be 
implemented at a local level, fitting in with the local legal culture, 
to make the public defender system more effective.117  This requires 
a change, however, from the current belief that a centralized 
system with full uniformity must exist. 
4. “The Legislature Should Enact Fixed Income Standards for Public 
Defender Eligibility . . . and Standard[s] Governing Which 
Clients Should Contribute Toward the Cost of Their Public 
Defenders”118 
This section addresses another example of a recommendation 
that at first glance sounds of good governance.  Certainly, a 
majority of court administrators, judges, and public defenders 
believe that those charged with a crime who can afford to 
reimburse at least some money towards the services of their 
attorney ought to pay.119  This recommendation, however, like most 
in a centralized model of governance, suggests that the sought 
results will always follow from the Legislature’s uniform standards.  
Empirical evidence suggests otherwise.120  As described later in this 
 
 117. See infra Part IV.A.–F. (suggesting basic components of a decentralized 
structure). 
 118. AUDITOR’S REPORT, supra note 2, at ix.  The Auditor’s Report analyzed 
Minnesota’s procedures for determining public defender eligibility and then 
made the recommendation that fixed income standards for public defender 
eligibility should be established.  Id. at 56–60.  The Auditor’s Report analyzed 
Minnesota’s broad eligibility standard and then made the recommendation to 
establish a single standard defining who should contribute to the cost of a public 
defender and the amount to be paid.  Id. at 64–69. 
 119. See id. at 67 (internal citations omitted) (stating “77 percent of court 
administrators, 63 percent of judges, and 54 percent of public defenders . . . 
agreed or strongly agreed that ‘all but the truly indigent should pay something 
toward the cost of their public defender’”). 
 120.  See AUDITOR’S REPORT, supra note 2, at 64 (stating that “[w]hile state law 
requires defendants with financial means to reimburse the state for a portion of 
their public defender costs, these reimbursements are inconsistently ordered and 
collected”).   Other notable disconnects between uniform standards and uniform 
results include Minnesota’s educational and welfare systems.  First, with regard to 
educational systems, “it is the duty of the legislature to establish a general and 
uniform system of public schools.”  MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1.  This duty to 
uniformly fund the state’s public school districts has already been discharged by 
the legislature.  See MINN. STAT. § 126C (2010).  Yet, an argument has been made 
that “the current [funding] system . . . permits high wealth districts to generate 
much more additional funding than their low wealth and average wealth 
counterparts,” thus “violat[ing] the constitutional duty of uniformity.”  Skeen v. 
State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 308 (Minn. 1993) (finding such an argument 
unpersuasive).  The court in Skeen held, 
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article, only an incentivized system will result in positive results.121 
The Rules of Criminal Procedure and certain statutes already 
provide guidance to judges in determining the qualification of 
individuals for a public defender.122  Further, the Minnesota court 
system has relatively uniform public defender applications and 
other documents.123  Yet the Legislative Auditor’s Report 
demonstrates great disparity in the amount of money collected 
from judicial districts for these services.  In particular, the 
Legislative Auditor’s Report points out that from 2007 to 2009 the 
 
The structure and history of the Minnesota Constitution indicates that 
while there is a fundamental right to a ‘general and uniform system of 
education,’ that fundamental right does not extend to the funding of the 
education system, beyond providing a basic funding level to assure that a 
general and uniform system is maintained. 
Id. at 315.  See also Minnesota, EDUC. JUSTICE, http://www.educationjustice.org
/states/minnesota.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2010) (discussing a 2000 settlement 
between the Minneapolis NAACP and the State concerning the State’s providing 
low-income and minority children inferior schools, despite the constitutional 
“uniformity” duty).   
  Second, with regard to welfare systems, Minnesota has a  Family 
Investment Program (MFIP), which gives low-income families welfare, but aims to 
help them begin earning income and get off the welfare rolls as soon as possible.  
The Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP), MINN. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., 
http://www.dhs.state.mn.us/main/idcplg?IdcService=GET_DYNAMIC_CONVERSION
&dDocName=id_004112&RevisionSelectionMethod=LatestReleased (last visited 
Nov. 24, 2010).  MFIP has been criticized because “recipients might linger on the 
caseload for two or three years . . . before they . . . needed to move . . . into the job 
market.”  David Hage, Welfare Reform: Minnesota Style, ST. LEGISLATURES, 
July/August 2004, at 43, available at http://www.heartland.org/custom/semod
_policybot/pdf/15779.pdf [hereinafter Hage, Welform Reform]; see also Judy Keen, 
Crackdowns Target Welfare Cheats, U.S.A. TODAY, Sept. 16, 2010, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-09-16-welfarefraud16_ST_N.htm 
(noting recession-driven welfare cheating in Anoka County).  But see Hage, Welfare 
Reform, supra, at 42–43 (noting the program’s well-documented positive 
employment and income effects).  Both of these examples show that uniform 
standards do not necessarily entail uniform results, and that space for localized 
“free play” should be preserved. 
 121. See infra Part IV.F. 
 122. See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 5.02, subdiv. 5 (2008) (“The court, if after previously 
finding that the defendant is eligible for public defender services, determines that 
the defendant now has the ability to pay part of the costs, may require a 
defendant, to the extent able, to compensate the governmental unit charged with 
paying the expense of the appointed public defender.”); MINN. STAT. § 611.17 
(2008) (requiring each judicial district to screen requests for representation by the 
district public defender). 
 123. As noted throughout, the authors do not believe such uniformity of 
documents creates positive results.  However, this example is provided only in 
response to the Legislative Auditor’s recommendation of more uniformity and the 
suggestion that such may lead to positive results. 
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Fifth Judicial District (southwest Minnesota), which reported 
26,340 criminal cases filed, ordered $321,412 as reimbursement for 
public defender services, whereas the Fourth Judicial District 
(Hennepin County), which reported 148,529 criminal cases filed, 
ordered only $7,227 as reimbursement.124 
This great disparity clearly demonstrates that uniformity will 
not enhance collections.  Instead, offering an incentive to local 
districts that review and collect such reimbursement will be more 
effective.  Thus, less centralization should be the solution. 
An example of such local creativity is occurring in Dakota 
County.125  Dakota County, as well as three other counties within 
the First Judicial District, has employed screeners to more carefully 
review public defender applications for eligibility and 
reimbursement.126  This type of creativity at the local level, if 
encouraged with financial incentive, is precisely the type of 
decentralization in governance which will help solve the public 
defense dilemma.   
IV. IMPROVEMENTS TO GOVERNANCE—CHANGES THAT CAN 
IMPROVE THE PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM (AND OTHER 
PARTS OF GOVERNMENT) 
“Any intelligent fool can make things bigger, more 
complex. . . . It takes a touch of genius—and a lot of courage—to 
move in the opposite direction.”127   
It is an understandable urge among policymakers, when faced 
with multiple levels of funding in any system, to desire to centralize 
that system in an attempt to equalize distribution of that service.  
This provides the appearance, though not the reality, as described 
earlier in this article.128  That is what occurred in the public defense 
system during the 1980s with the advent of the State Board of 




 124. AUDITOR’S REPORT, supra note 2, at 65 tbl.4.4. 
 125. See Joy Powell, Who Gets a Free Lawyer?: As the Ranks of Public Defenders 
Shrink, Dakota County Tries to Make Sure Only the Truly Poor Qualify, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), June 5, 2010, at 1B, available at 2010 WLNR 11773741. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See supra note 1.  
 128. See supra Part III.B (proposing that centralization, rather than funding, is 
the problem). 
 129. MINN. STAT. § 611.215 (2010). 
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This law outlines the membership structure of the Board of 
Public Defense130 and creates an ad hoc Board of Public Defense 
when considering the appointment of district public defenders.131  
It further describes the appointment of a Chief Administrator and 
describes that person’s duties.132  Within this framework, it 
describes further duties and obligations of the Board of Public 
Defense to allocate funds, establish attorney case loads, establishes 
minimum qualifications for public defenders, as well as other 
duties.133 
The centralization of the public defense system in Minnesota is 
not unique from other areas of government during this same time 
period.  As described earlier, during the past forty years, state 
expenditures have increased at double-digit rates in all but four of 
the past biennia.134  Most closely to the authors’ experience of such 
centralization is the recent completion of state funding, and hence 
centralization, of the Judicial Branch.135   
Often, the start of such governance is the promise by policy 
makers to provide statewide, and thus equalized, funding of the 
service.  This is an understandable desire to provide an equalized 
funding source when, as in criminal defense, the obligation to 
provide the service is constitutional.136  The thought process is that 
funding ought to come from a statewide source when the 
obligation to provide the service is a statewide constitutional 
mandate.  One may argue that this description of the source of 
funding bears little on the issue of proper governance because all 
funding, whether federal, state, or local, comes from the tax payers. 
There may be little dispute of this policy thought process, but 
the common mistake is to believe that state funding must 
necessarily also be accompanied by statewide centralized 
governance.  No evidence positively equates state funding to state 
centralization, or more importantly, centralized governance with 
an improvement of the service or greater accountability of the use 
 
 130. Id. at subdiv. 1(a)–(b). 
 131. Id. at subdiv. 1(c). 
 132. Id. at subdiv. 1a. 
 133. Id. at subdiv. 2. 
 134. Capitol Solutions, supra note 73. 
 135. The last transfer of court administration expenditure from the county to 
the state occurred on July 1, 2005, for the Sixth and the Tenth Judicial Districts.  
See MINN. STAT. § 480.183 (2010). 
 136. See MINN. CONST., art. I, § 6; see also Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1 
(Minn. 1996). 
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of public funds.  Evidence, such as demonstrated by the current 
plight of the public defender system, indicates that such 
centralization does the opposite. 
It is the authors’ recommendation that if solutions are 
implemented as part of a decentralization of the public defender 
system, this will result in greater accountability, flexibility, and a 
greater team approach among all criminal justice partners at the 
local level.  The public will benefit from this improvement both in 
terms of the improved service and the accountability of public 
funds. 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines centralization as 
“[c]oncentration of power and authority in a central organization 
or government.”137  Merriam-Webster defines decentralization as 
“the dispersion or distribution of functions and powers; specifically: 
the delegation of power from a central authority to regional and 
local authorities.”138 
Government, it may be argued, often lags behind private 
industry when it comes to best management practices.139  Though 
we often hear stated in government leadership circles the desire for 
employee qualities such as “empowerment,” “team building,” and 
“trust,” actions in a centralized governance system most often result 
in the opposite result.140 
One leader of business management improvement techniques 
described the result of centralized governance as follows: “The 
evidence is clear and overwhelming.  Centralized, hierarchical 
organizations work about as well as the old Soviet Union.  Despite 
all the evidence, we keep smacking into many variations on the 
centralization themes.”141 
 
 137. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 204 (5th ed. 1979).  
 138. MERRIAM-WEBSTER, INC., http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/decentralization (last visited Nov. 24, 2010) (defining “decentralization”). 
 139. See U.S. Government Lags in Promoting Corporate Responsibility, BUS. WIRE (July 
1, 2010, 12:06 PM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20100701006133
/en/Government-Lags-Promoting-Corporate-Responsibility; see also APPLIED 
GEOGRAPHICS, INC., A PROGRAM FOR TRANSFORMED GIS IN THE STATE OF MINNESOTA 2 
(2009), available at http://www.gis.state.mn.us/committee/MSDI/dte/ProgramDesign
_FinalFeb09_V21.pdf (stating that the “overarching objective” of this executive 
branch effort is to improve management practices in the public sector and to 
encourage “government to act together as an enterprise,” evidencing an 
acceptance of the belief that government bureaucracy does not manage itself 
well). 
 140. See supra Part III.  
 141. Jim Clemer, Decentralized Organization Structures Empower and Energize, 
OPPAPERS.COM (June 1, 2010), http://www.oppapers.com/essays
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The difference is that in a decentralized organization, as 
compared to centralized organizations, the same concepts of 
“empowerment,” “teams,” and “trust” become actions—not just 
words.  The same is true in the government and is arguably more 
important because we rely on the public’s money to deliver the 
governmental services.  Hence, increasing governmental 
accountability closer to the people who are served by the 
government fits our country’s long history of liberty. 
The decentralization of the public defense system will provide 
the structure to better utilize its existing resources and will increase 
trust and confidence in the professionals within the system.  Some 
basic components of how this decentralized structure might look in 
the public defender system are suggested below.142 
A. Ten Public Defense Districts 
Rather than the current single statewide Board of Public 
Defense,143 the state should eliminate the single governance board 
concept, and instead, arrange public defense among the current 
ten Judicial Districts.  Advisory boards could be established with 
membership from each county within those Districts.144  Further 
governance at the county level will be outlined below.145 
Distribution of funds within the ten Judicial Districts could be 
based upon an analysis of district size, both geographic as well as 
population, case load, and any unique district needs.  The 
distribution of funds is never easy due to usual political issues;146 
however, this is also the case in a centralized system147 and ought 
not to be an excuse to avoid the improvement to the overall system.  
An advisory committee, together with the counties, would also 
allocate additional services, such as investigative time and expert 




 142. The authors concede that there are many feasible ideas to decentralize 
the public defender system and other agencies and branches of government.  
These ideas are suggested to begin the discussion. 
 143. See supra text accompanying notes 49–53. 
 144. Consideration could be made as to who makes appointment to the 
advisory board, whether through county commissioners, judges, or a combination 
of both. 
 145. See infra Part IV.B. 
 146. See Russell, supra note 59.   
 147. Id.  
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This would allow for the elimination of many of the layers of 
management in the current system.  For instance, there will be no 
need for a chief public defense administrator at the state level, or 
chief public defenders at the district level.  Management of the 
public defenders at the district and county level would be 
determined by the local advisory groups and likely would consist of 
some form of “lead” public defenders, combined with self-
management and working with other members of the local 
criminal justice system. 
B. County Governance 
Within each of the Judicial Districts, the counties would also 
provide direct governance of the public defenders.  The current 
criminal justice system in all of Minnesota’s eighty-seven counties 
includes a local county attorney who reports to a Board of 
Commissioners.148  Those counties are responsible for criminal 
prosecutions, child protection, juvenile matters, and allocating the 
budget.149  Each of these counties has correctional officers involved 
as well.150  Though the funding source for these systems is all 
different,151 the broad goals of criminal justice for all participants 
remain the same. 
These counties could share the budgetary allocation between 
both prosecution and defense.  Broad supervision of this allocation 
(to assure an equitable division of funds) can occur at the judicial 
district level to resolve any disputes.  The ability to involve all 
parties in the local justice community, however, will increase the 
likelihood of greater teamwork and will allow for greater flexibility 
to utilize funds which match local interests.  Though the attorneys 
will ultimately have different obligations in and outside of the 
courtroom involving their cases, such collaboration will increase 
the likelihood of a just and efficient result. 
 
 148. See County Government Structure, ASS’N OF MINN. CNTYS. (Apr. 2008), 
http://www.mncounties.org/Publications/FYIs/pdf/CountyGov_Structure08.pdf. 
 149. See The County Attorney’s Office, ASS’N OF MINN. CNTYS., 
http://www.mncounties.org/Publications/FYIs/PDF/County_Attorney08.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 24, 2010). 
 150. See Correctional Services, ASS’N OF MINN. CNTYS. (July 2007), 
http://www.mncounties.org/Publications/FYIs/PDF/Correctional_Services08.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2010). 
 151. For instance, there are currently three separate delivery services of 
corrections—state, county, and community corrections.  
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C. Increased Professionalism 
As noted above, attorneys in the public defender system are 
subject to the same ethical standards as all attorneys in 
Minnesota.152  Thus, they are obligated to effectively represent their 
clients.153  How the attorney arranges her or his time, the strategies 
involved, and the criminal justice dynamics involved in each legal 
community will all be left to the local public defenders.  Thus, 
larger urban communities may decide to have more formal 
associations of their public defenders.  In the rural districts, 
especially among part-time public defenders, local decisions are 
made by those individual attorneys in a much less formal way. 
The increased responsibility and freedom to rely on the 
experience of these attorneys will, consequently, increase the 
professionalism of these attorneys. 
D. Part-Time Public Defenders 
Local districts will be free to consider greater use of part-time 
public defenders.  The decision, as with all decisions in this 
decentralized system, will vary across the state.  Among the 
decisions presented to each district and the counties within that 
district will be allocation of funds.  It is conceivable that a more 
effective use of the funds available would be to hire, almost 
exclusively, part-time public defenders.  In some districts, it may 
also be prudent to consider pro bono opportunities for new 
lawyers.  Many local firms with multiple lawyers may appreciate this 
experience afforded to their new attorneys. 
As explained above, there is no evidence to suggest that 
attorneys who devote only a portion of their legal practice to public 
defense are less prepared or less able to handle these types of 
cases.154  Further, it is arguable that this division of duties for an 
attorney is more consistent with the traditional experience of 
attorneys—in that they handle a wide array of matters and clients.  
This process would result in less expensive, wider public defense 
coverage, while maintaining a high level of competence. 
 
 152. See supra Part III.C.2; MINNESOTA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2010). 
 153. See supra Part III.C.2; MINNESOTA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2010). 
 154. See supra Part III.C.2 
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E. Increased Justice Community Collaboration 
When professionals within the judicial community work 
together, it benefits not only those who are progressing through 
the system, but also the public at large.  This is already a reality in 
many districts despite their varied sources of governance within the 
system.  Once governance of all those within the justice system are 
localized, collaboration will increase.  As noted above, the 
professionals involved realize they have separate professional 
obligations to carry out their particular role in the system.155  These 
same professionals also realize that by working together, their roles 
can be combined to provide a more effective result. 
F. Increased Incentive to Obtain Partial Reimbursement for Services 
As was described in the previous section, lack of guidelines to 
see partial reimbursement for public defender services is not the 
problem.156  Lack of incentive to do so is the problem.157  With the 
decentralized system, once all reimbursements are retained at the 
local level, incentive to carefully review and seek reimbursement 
will occur.  This result is yet another example of how 
decentralization increases effectiveness and accountability to the 
public. 
There are many forms that decentralization may take.  The 
suggestions described in this article demonstrate a sample of what 
form it could take and the many benefits to the system which will 
occur as a result. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Addressing the issues facing the state’s public defender system 
requires acknowledging the following premises: there is no “new” 
money; criminal defense is constitutionally required;158 the financial 
problems in the public defense system are not unique;159 and 
increasing collaboration among all involved in the criminal justice 
community will aid in creating long-term solutions.160 
 
 
 155. See id.   
 156. See supra Part III.C.4. 
 157. See id.   
 158. See supra Part II.A–C. 
 159. See AUDITOR’S REPORT, supra note 2. 
 160. See supra Part IV.   
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This combination of premises leads to the conclusion that 
temporary reforms or methods of increasing revenue in the form of 
fees, taxes, or otherwise will not affect change.  Therefore, a long-
term approach which changes the public defender system and 
which results in greater flexibility in the use of existing resources 
and relies on the ingenuity and professionalism of our public 
defenders across the state in a decentralized way will lead to greater 
solutions and to an even greater public defender system. 
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